International Socialists

TOM BRAMBLE OUTLINES THE LOGIC AND LIMITATIONS OF AMERICA’S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN ITS GLOBAL EMPIRE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The US’s vast military budget, the technological edge enjoyed by its forces, the presence of bases across the entire Eurasian continent, and the sheer political clout wielded by the US ruling class give the impression that we are witnessing the birth of a new empire. Indeed, such is the self-confidence of the US ruling class that leading figures are now making open comparisons with the glory days of the Roman Empire.

Yet appearances can be deceptive. Although the US is in some ways well placed to try and stamp its authority on the world, its lurch to military aggression is testimony not only to the country’s strength but also to its underlying weaknesses. And the more that the US ruling class wages war around the world, the more it is likely to provoke a backlash that could bring it tumbling down.

The Bush doctrine is a recognition of the fact that the US ruling class can no longer dominate the world economically in the way that it did in the decades following World War II. In 1945, the US controlled one half of world manufacturing output; the figure today is only 30 percent. During the course of the long post-war boom, Japanese and European companies in particular took market share once controlled by US multinationals. Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, US ruling class strategy has increasingly been to use the country’s military power to compensate for its long-term economic decline in terms of asserting its domination over rival emerging imperialists.

Set alongside this long-term trend, however, is the stagnation of the economies of the US’s great rivals since the early 1990s – Japan has been mired in a ten-year recession, while Germany has experienced only fitful economic growth. Meanwhile, the economic capacity of China, the potential giant of Asia, has not reached the point where it could seriously challenge the United States for leadership of the world economy. The collapse of the USSR, and the consequential unprecedented military dominance of the US has also given them room to manoeuvre. The result is a feeling of self-confidence amongst the US ruling class – it feels that it has a short-term window of opportunity to press ahead aggressively against its rivals.

In particular, military domination of the Middle East and Central Asia will give the US Government control of oil. It will allow the US extra leverage against the rival ruling classes of Japan, China, and the European Union that depend heavily on Middle Eastern oil. Control over the flow of oil will add to the leading edge that the US already enjoys against its rivals in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and International Monetary Fund. B-1 bombers and the threat of nuclear first strike allow IBM, Ford, Caterpillar, Citibank and Coca-Cola to secure their interests in a way that “pure” economic competition could not.

Limitations
However, Bush’s “solution” to the long-term declining economic prowess of US corporations also points to its own internal contradictions.

The first is economic. The ability of the US to sustain the huge level of arms spending and the expected US$300 billion budget deficit this year is dependent upon its ability to convince the rest of the world to hold US dollars and buy US government bonds. While this was not a problem in the booming 1990s, when the US economy sucked in large amounts of cash from overseas investors, driving the stock market bonanza of those years, record low US interest rates, the three-year slump in Wall Street, and the burgeoning trade deficit have all undermined confidence in the US dollar, pushing it down by 15 percent against the euro and 10 percent against the yen in 2002 alone. All of a sudden, the ability of the US ruling class to get the rest of the world to foot the bill for its escalation in arms spending is looking shaky. Underpinning these medium-term problems is the long-term decline in the corporate rate of profit, the motor force of any capitalist economy, which is now sinking again after surging in the 1980s and early 1990s.

These economic problems have political consequences for the US ruling class. Even the rumour that the Chinese government would shift some of its assets into euros rather than US dollars sent the dollar lower in January. The vulnerability of the US economy therefore gives the Chinese government leverage against the United States.

The second major limit to the power of US imperialism is, therefore, competition from rival ruling classes. This is most evident in Europe. Just as the bombing of Iraq is meant to demonstrate the sheer power of the US ruling class to Berlin and Paris, it also raises tensions. Much as Bush and his cronies would like to ignore the French and German governments, they know that they cannot ride roughshod over Europe’s economic powerhouses. They may try to cultivate Eastern European governments, but when push comes to shove it is these two giants that matter. And the ruling classes of these two countries are not going to surrender to the US without a fight: hence their decision to force a month-long crisis in NATO in February over arms shipments to Turkey.

Similarly, although the Chinese and Russian ruling classes are desperate for US foreign investment and access to US markets, they are also aware that Bush’s National Security Strategy involves their gradual encirclement on their southern borders by US bases and US puppet governments. China’s rulers are also worried that a US triumph on the Korean peninsula would bring US forces right to their border. The Chinese government is therefore using its rapid economic growth to boost its own arms spending, which may potentially threaten US control over the Asian region in coming years.

Then there are the Arab governments, who depend on US military and diplomatic support but who are sitting on top of a tinderbox of rising radical Islamist sentiment, fuelled by Israeli state terrorism and the US attempt to recolonise the Middle East. None of them would be returned to power in a genuinely popular vote, and they increasingly fear that the Islamist force that many once actively sponsored as a bulwark against mass left-wing organisations might now turn against them. Hence the refusal of many Arab governments to garrison US forces for the attack on Iraq this time around.

And finally, the war on terror, far from pacifying the world, only ratchets up military tensions that the US will be incapable of subduing. With “pre-emptive strike” now regarded as a legitimate strategy, the nuclear-armed Indian and Pakistan governments are itching for an excuse for a war. North Korea is resuming its nuclear programme, as is Iran.

US attempts to enforce its rule as the world’s unchallengeable superpower are therefore only contributing to rising military tensions all over the world.

Domestic opposition
The last major limit to US power is domestic. Bush is hoping to use war fever to distract attention from growing social tensions within the US that are on the rise as the boom bursts and as Bush shovels billions of dollars to the country’s wealthy elite. The decline on Wall Street is now shredding the pension plans of millions of the US middle class and better off sections of the working class, who now face bleak retirement prospects. And the working class in general faces massive attacks on what is left of the US social security system, alongside corporate attempts to revive share prices by shutting factories and sacking workers. These attacks come on top of two decades of a systematic offensive, starting with the election of the Reagan Government in 1980.

Furthermore, if Bush and his generals are going to fight limitless wars, they have to convince the US public to accept thousands of US casualties. Although ten years of “humanitarian interventions” in Somalia, Yugoslavia and elsewhere have softened US public opposition to the deployment of troops overseas, there is no sign that people are ready to accept the return home of large numbers of GIs in body bags. The “Vietnam Syndrome” is still a vital factor in US politics. Additionally, there is widespread revulsion at what is plainly an attack on Iraqi civilians, including the threat of a nuclear strike, for the benefit of oil interests. Opposition to the war within the US was massive and is only likely to grow with future attacks.

Every step that the US ruling class takes to establish its military might only stores up increasing resentment amongst the US working class who can see the clear political priorities of a government which can find billions for weapons but nothing for health or social security. The last time the US was engaged in a “war until victory,” in Vietnam, it had to send in the National Guard to take back the streets of Detroit and Los Angeles from rioting African-Americans. The same social tensions that underpinned the riots exist today, but this time the African-Americans may well be joined on the streets by whites and Hispanics sick of 20 years of sacrifice and austerity.

The new Bush doctrine heralds the attempt by the US to totally dominate the world. But even after a decisive victory in Iraq the US ruling class faces ongoing problems and opposition on many fronts. A resumption of its relative economic decline. A rise in social instability as protests grow, both directly about US military adventurism, and indirectly by workers and the poor angry at being made to bear its cost. The unravelling of the old alliance with the major European powers. And increasing military tensions with and between medium-level powers, possibly leading to a nuclear exchange. Everywhere the US turns, it is faced by the reality, not only of its power, but also of its limitations.