International Socialists

The second Palestinian Intifada that began in October 2000 reflected the rage of ordinary Palestinians at the futility of the "peace process," negotiated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and overseen by the United States.

 

In 1988, the PLO, in an act of desperation, gave up its goal of a democratic secular state of Palestine in favour of the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

 

The PLO's previous strategy was then in tatters. That strategy had sought to combine guerrilla warfare and diplomacy, both of which relied on keeping onside with oppressive Arab regimes. Yet the Palestinians have repeatedly been betrayed by these supposed friends.

 

In the 1960s the PLO developed a military force in Jordan, based in Palestinian refugee camps. They were destroyed or driven out by the Jordanian government in 1970. During the 1970s, the Palestinians became a major political force in Lebanon. Syrian troops intervened to limit their influence and that of the Lebanese left. Then Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 drove the PLO out of the country.

 

Fatah, the strongest organisation in the PLO, was dominated by well-off sections of the Palestinian diaspora - people like PLO leader Yasser Arafat himself, who had been a successful engineer in Kuwait. The PLO's strategy reflected their interests and those of its backers among the Arab states. The focus on guerrilla warfare and diplomacy ruled out mobilising ordinary Arabs to challenge the authority of their rulers.

 

The Palestinian bourgeoisie's economic wellbeing in the diaspora depends on the stability of the governments of their host countries. All of the Arab states have, at one time or another, done deals with the US or Israel. Jordan and Egypt are today thoroughly within the US orbit and have been on friendly terms with Israel. Egypt is, after Israel, the second largest recipient of US aid.

 

There is widespread support for the Palestinians among the masses of the Arab world. And the working class of the region, particularly in Egypt, is a large and potentially powerful force. But Arafat has never looked to it as the key ally in the struggle against Israel.

 

The outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987 signalled a revival of Palestinian resistance. The conflict increasingly demoralised Israeli troops and created divisions in Israeli society. A peace movement emerged.

 

The United States, Israel's economic and military backer, wanted a settlement. US influence in the region had been dramatically increased by its victory in the 1991 war against Iraq. Resolving the conflict in Palestine would consolidate its power.

 

Worried by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and under pressure from the Intifada, the US and Israeli governments turned to the PLO as the only current capable of negotiating on behalf of Palestinians and, they hoped, of policing the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said:

 

I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in Gaza. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the [Israeli] Association for Civil Rights from criticising the conditions there.

 

Arafat grasped the opportunity to come in from the cold on the back of the Intifada, which he promptly called off.

 

To remain on friendly terms with Israel and the US, Arafat was prepared to repress opponents of the "peace process." Far from inspiring workers in surrounding countries to oppose their own governments' repressive policies and deals with Israel, the Palestinian leadership mirrored their behaviour.

 

Following the Oslo Accords of 1993, the PLO, transformed into the Palestinian Authority, took over the policing of the rebellious population of the Occupied Territories. As Human Rights Watch has documented, the PA, like Israel, used arbitrary arrest, torture, violence and censorship against Palestinian dissidents. These excesses were a direct consequence of the Authority's compromises with Israel.

 

Arafat was caught between the Palestinian masses and Israel and the US. On the one hand, he called for an end to "terrorism" against Israel and jailed those who criticised his sell-outs and abuses. On the other, elements in Fatah organised the Intifada and even suicide attacks.

 

To the extent that Arafat and the PA resist Israel, we support them. But that does not mean endorsing Arafat's strategy, his "two state solution" or the even weaker version proposed by the Saudi government, still less Bush's suggestions. While Israel exists, a Palestinian state can only be a bantustan, like those in apartheid South Africa. Its government could only hold on to power by authoritarian means and relying on Israeli support.

 

Arafat's approach regarded the Intifada as a mere bargaining tool in diplomatic negotiations, relied on the good intentions of US governments and refrained from challenging Arab regimes. It has failed.

 

The alternative is not a quick fix. But a strategy of building a broader Intifada against Israel, the US and their allies across the region could deliver justice for the Palestinians in the form of a democratic, secular state, as part of a wider settling of accounts with oppression.