by Te Ahu

Introduction

Historically, the intensity and momentum of Maori political activism has
never been consistent. Upturns in protest activity are followed by
downturns in struggle and vice versa. The 1970s were witness to a dramatic
upsurge in Maori activism which had a profound effect on New Zealand
society. The political turbulence created in the wake of the 1975 land
march on parliament, Bastion Point, Raglan and the regular protests at
Waitangi, once again revealed the exploitative and oppressive foundations
on which capitalism had been established in Aotearoa.

Maori political activism has traditionally been an extremely heterogeneous
social force encompassing a considerable variety of political strategies,
campaigns and participants. Indeed, it is only a 'movement' in the most
tenuous sense (Greenland, 1984: 87). Walker has claimed that both 'radical'
and 'conservative' elements of the Maori nationalist movement pursued the
same objectives although the methods they used differed (Walker 1990: 243).
However, agreement on the vision of tino rangatiratanga is far from
unanimous. It can simultaneously be identified with Maori capitalism, Maori
electoral power, cultural nationalism or revolutionary activity. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s Maori activists commonly asserted, in however
ill-conceived or confused ways, that reformism was not an effective
strategy and that only through a fundamental transformation of the system
could Maori achieve liberation. More than two decades later the situation
is completely different. While many still look to constitutional change and
electoral politics to reform the worst excesses of the system, a number of
powerful tribal executives and corporate warriors have argued, like the New
Right ideologues in treasury and the Business Roundtable, that the welfare
system has held Maori back and that real self-determination and liberation
for Maori can only be achieved under unrestrained, freemarket capitalism
(see Kukutai, 1995). In this way the objective of tino rangatiratanga as
espoused by various groups is unclear and at times contradictory. This is
symptomatic of the fact that despite the occasional separatist rhetoric,
Maori movements are not autonomous of the underlying social structures,
political forces and ideologies of capitalist society.

This chapter provides a descriptive overview of the evolution from the
progressive political activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s to the
cultural nationalist framework that dominated much Maori political strategy
from the 1980s. It then critically examines the ideological assumptions of
cultural nationalism. The chapter finally explores the effectiveness of
cultural nationalism and identity politics as a strategy for Maori
liberation.

Founding members of Nga Tamatoa on the steps of parliament, 1972 

(i) The Seeds of Contemporary Maori Activism 1967-1975

The collapse of the post-war long boom saw an international resurgence in class conflict and industrial militancy on an unprecedented scale from 1968 o the mid-1970s (Roper, 1993: 2; Harman, 1988). The global upturn in class struggle from the late 1960s was closely related o the emergence of the New Left internationally. The dramatic growth in student political activism, the anti-war movement in the west, Black liberation in the United States, and the national liberation struggle against United States imperialism were important features in the political
milieux. It was also characterised by the growth in social movements, which included the women's liberation movement, the anti-racist movement, the environmental movement and the gay and lesbian rights movements (Ibid.).

The emergence of the New Left in Aotearoa closely paralleled developments internationally. The late 1960s saw the growth of student activism and the development of social movements such as the women's liberation movement, the anti-racist movement, the environmental movement, gay and lesbian rights movements and so forth (see Dann, 1985; Roper, 1990). The period was also characterised by a dramatic upturn in class struggle and a sea change in popular culture, which in part reflected the growing influence of
radical intellectual traditions, in particular Marxism and feminism. All this had a profound influence on the organisation and strategies of Maori protest groups that emerged during that period.

Initially, Maori protest groups formed part of the progressive social movements of the time, and they actively sought to broaden, both quantitatively and qualitatively the struggle against racism and Maori inequality. Indeed, although some were explicitly nationalist in their orientation, these movements were consciously part of the Left.

The Anti-Racist Movement

A close working relationship was forged between Pakeha anti-racist groups
and what eventually evolved into the Maori protest movements of the late
1960s. Initially, this relationship crystallised around the opposition that
emerged to the New Zealand Rugby Football Union's decision to exclude Maori
rugby players from the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa. This generated
intense opposition and the 'No Maori, no tour' protests extended their
focus not only to the question of the exclusion of Blacks in the Springbok
team itself, but to the moral justification of contact with a nation which
practised apartheid and wider issues of social justice.

Pakeha based organisations such as CARE (which included a number of young
Maori political activists within its ranks) maintained a close relationship
with various Maori groups and individuals in united front activities
(Sorrenson, Newnham and de Bres, 1974: 4). CARE for example, arranged
numerous panel discussions on the position of the Maori in New Zealand
society and was pivotal in the launching and promotion of a national
campaign against New Zealand's involvement in apartheid sport, using the
contributions of Maori speakers such as Syd Jackson, Matiu Rata, Koro
Dewes, Whetu Tirikatane and Hone Tuwhare for their publicity campaign
against the tour (see Jackson, 1969). This interaction between Maori groups
and the anti-racist movement was pivotal in the establishment of the
umbrella organisation Halt All Racist Tours (HART) in 1969. The name was
actually suggested by Tama Poata, the secretary of the Maori Organisation
on Human Rights (MOOHR) (Awatere, 1982). The relationship between Maori
protest groups and the movement against apartheid was an enduring one
(although not without conflict) culminating in the opposition to the 1981 Springbok Tour.

Women's Liberation Movement

>From the late 1960s influential individuals such as Ngahuia Te Awekotuku
and Donna Awatere had consistently publicised the barriers in Maori society
that had prevented Maori women from participating in, and contributing to,
Maori society as they saw fit. Their critiques of the patriarchal nature of
traditional Maori leadership and the issue of Maori women's marae speaking
rights reflected the influence of the women's liberation movement, in which
a number of Maori women actively participated (see Dann, 1985). By the
mid-1970s there emerged a larger group of Maori women within Nga Tamatoa
who adopted a 'feminist' theoretical analysis of the oppression of Maori
women. For many young Maori women involved in activist movements like Nga
Tamatoa, an increasing consciousness of their role as 'black' women emerged
gradually from the mid-1970s and crystallised around the frustration and
anger experienced by Maori women during the Maori land rights movement.

For many women there was an underlying tension between the politics,
culture and language of Maori society that they were struggling to preserve
and their own liberation from this oppression as Maori women. Ngahuia Te
Awekotuku noted the significance and momentum of the renaissance in 'Maori'
awareness, but expressed concern that the role of Maori women in the
struggle not be restricted: "[w]e, Maori females, can only hope that they
recognise the need, and the merit of our energy in this fight ... and not
deny knowledge and access to half our people" (Te Awekotuku, 1991: 47).
Indeed, for many Maori women it was a battle on two fronts. Firstly in the
struggle over land, and secondly in the struggle for equality within the
movement (Farr, 1978).

A strong network of Maori women crystallised around the day to day
struggles against racism and sexual discrimination, and in this process a
number of leading Maori women began to openly examine the oppression of
women within Maori society, and the continual barriers that were
established to limit their influence in the movement. Their developing
political ideology consisted of a mixture of 'Black feminism' and Maori
nationalism which was to prove extremely influential as the movement
unfolded in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The Trade Union Movement

The dramatic increase in strike activity and class struggle from the late
1960s had a profound influence in terms of the political education of
thousands of Maori workers involved in the struggle for better wages and
conditions. Indeed, the influence of the trade union movement in providing
an organisational base for Maori protest groups is most clearly
demonstrated in the emergence of Te Hokioi and the Maori Organisation on
Human Rights (MOOHR). Both groups were based in Wellington and both had
strong trade union links. Tama Poata, the secretary of MOOHR, was also an
active member of the Wellington Drivers Union and the New Zealand Communist
Party.

Both organisations advocated an alliance between Maori and the progressive
elements of the working class. Indeed, for Te Hokioi the fundamental
contradiction in society was between labour and capital, between the
workers on the one hand and the bosses and land owners on the other. Racism
was seen to be an outcome of class inequality. In this regard the majority
of Maori were seen as an oppressed section of the working class. Both
groups advocated a pan-racial struggle along class lines as the most
effective strategy for resolving racism and Maori inequality.

Te Hokioi and MOOHR issued numerous newsletters and pamphlets to publicise
their cause. Te Hokioi itself adopted the name of the anti-government
newspaper of the Maori King Movement and proclaimed itself as a "taiaha of
truth for kotahitanga within the Maori Nation." From its inception, MOOHR
pledged to defend human rights not only of Maori but of all 'minorities.'
(Walker, 1980). It urged both Maori and Pakeha to fight against racism and
discrimination and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus
MOOHR were at pains to emphasize that it was 'rich Pakeha' to blame for
racism, not all Pakeha (MOOHR, 1970).

MOOHR played a vigorous role in publicising the racism and discrimination
in housing, sport, employment, and the infringement of Maori political
rights. Together with Te Hokioi, MOOHR embraced Treaty of Waitangi issues,
the alienation of Maori land, 'race-relations' and resource depletion.
MOOHR put an emphasis on the Treaty of Waitangi as a possible cornerstone
of a harmonious, bicultural country provided that past injustices were
redeemed.

The inspiration and momentum that underpinned Te Hokioi and MOOHR subsided
gradually during the early 1970s with MOOHR finally merging with Matekite
in the land rights movement in 1975. The decline of MOOHR and Te Hokioi
reflected the growing influence of Black Power and rhetoric. Indeed the
impetus of the movement shifted to the 'Brown Power' of newly emerging
Auckland Maori protest groups.
TOP

(ii) Brown Power

The emergence of Nga Tamatoa in the early 1970s saw the articulation of the
idea that racism was the basic social cleavage in society. This was most
clearly amplified in their rhetoric of 'Brown Power' which represented a
fundamental rejection of the racist institutions and values of New Zealand
society. Like the Black Power philosophies of Stokely Carmichael and
Charles V Hamilton, Brown Power was based on the fundamental premise that:
"...group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively
from a bargaining position of strength..." (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1970:
146). Thus advocates of Brown Power urged Maori to unite, to recognise
their common history and to build a sense of solidarity and community. They
emphasised the goal of Maori self-determination, that is, the capacity for
Maori to define their own goals and to develop their own separate
organisations and institutions. In its early stages, members of Tamatoa
were influenced by the revolutionary wing of the Black Power movement in
the United States, but as Nga Tamatoa developed different interests and
objectives began to be articulated. Indeed, there was a division in the
movement between the conservative, university educated students such as Syd
and Hana Jackson, Peter Rikys and Donna Awatere, and the more militant
exponents of Black Power such as John Ohia, Paul Kotara and Ted Nia
(Walker, 1990: 210).
At first it was this more radical faction with their talk of Brown Power
and Maori liberation that attracted the sensational media headlines.
However, it was the more conservative element of Tamatoa that took control
of the movement. Their strategies differed from the militants in that they
tended to look to 'liberal' elements in the ruling class for change. They
did this because their political outlook was based on a belief that
provided the appropriate legal measures were put in place, Maori could
prosper. Hence their emphasis on self-help programmes for Maori development.

Nga Tamatoa employed the protest techniques and tactics popularised during
the late 1960s such as the use of petitions, demonstrations and pickets.
They initiated the tradition of the annual protests at Waitangi Day
celebrations.

There was a fundamental belief that New Zealand capitalism coupled with the
parliamentary political system could be cleansed of racism. In essence this
view reflected the interests of middle class university educated Maori
based on a strategy of advancement within the system. In this way the Brown
Power slogan was unclear. It could be identified with Maori capitalism or
revolutionary activity.

The Auckland gang problem encouraged cooperation between Nga Tamatoa and a
new emerging group, the Polynesian Panthers. The Polynesian Panther
Movement, founded in June 1971 had a largely Pacific Island membership and
was explicitly influenced by the Black Panther Party in the US (Polynesian
Panther Party, 1975: 225). They were particularly influenced by Huey
Newton's policy of black unity, and repeated his distinction between
revolutionary and cultural nationalism in their arguments with the
conservative members of Nga Tamatoa. The Panthers located the causes of
Maori and Pacific Island oppression within the exploitative social
relations of the capitalist system of production. Consequently, the
Polynesian Panthers promoted a strategy of liberation based on the complete
overthrow of the capitalist system and the social relations necessary for
its development.

The revolution we openly rap about is one of total change. The revolution
is one to liberate us from racism, oppression and capitalism. We see that
many of our problems of oppression and racism are tools of this society's
outlook based on capitalism; hence for total change one must change society
altogether (Polynesian Panther Party, 1975: 226).

In practice this meant that the Panthers stood in solidarity with other
liberation struggles, oppressed groups and activists, working toward a
global revolution (Ibid.). They publicised the everyday struggles of Maori
and Pacific Islanders, from land claims to the discrimination and violence
of the police (Polynesian Panther Party, 1976). In particular the Panthers
sought a pan-ethnic grouping of both Maori and Pacific Islanders and their
views competed with those of Nga Tamatoa who favoured Maori unity first
(Polynesian Panther Party, 1975: 225-226).

(iii) Maori Land Rights Movement 1975-1984: "Not One More Acre!"

As the struggle against Maori oppression and racism intensified, the early
movement started to polarise. At the root of this was whether the whole
system had to be overthrown and a new society build in its place, or
whether real change for Maori could come through the existing political
structures. Support for the conservative strategies pursued by groups like
Nga Tamatoa rested on the expectation that the state would make significant
concessions. However, as the struggle intensified the failure to stem the
tide of land alienation through official channels led to a widespread
pessimism about the ability of the third Labour Government (1972-75) to
secure Maori rights. This led many frustrated militants to look at more
direct strategies.

>From 1975 to 1978, the Maori land rights movement brought together a wide
range of activists. Indeed, such diversity in struggle was actively
promoted by Te Ropu o te Matakite, the organising committee of the 1975
Land March on Parliament. In particular Matakite sought to consolidate
links with workers, both Pakeha and Maori who were perceived as natural
allies in the struggle:

We see no difference between the aspirations of Maori people and the desire
of workers in their struggles. We seek the support of workers and
organisations, as the only viable bodies which have sympathy and
understanding of the Maori people and their desires. The people who are
oppressing the workers are the same who are exploiting the Maori today (Te
Roopu o te Matakite, 1975).

Despite the divergent political and strategic philosophies there was no
room to mistake the object of protest and the enemy of Maori as anything
other than a state which was seen as being both racist and capitalist.

The occupation of Bastion Point and the subsequent eviction intensified the
experience of direct conflict with the state. The occupation again brought
together the diverse Pakeha left, and mobilised wide public support
(Walker, 1990: 218). The Auckland Trades Council placed a 'green ban' on
the area declaring that no work would begin on the planned sub-division. A
North Shore contractor even donated six trucks, including two bitumen
tankers to help with a planned blockade (Auckland Star, 1977).

The occupation at Bastion Point was followed by the arrest of seventeen
protesters in February 1978 at the Raglan Golf Course. The arrests occurred
on land taken from Tainui Awhiro under the Emergency War Act for a military
aerodrome during World War II and never returned. Among those arrested were
representatives of Nga Tamatoa, Matakite o Aotearoa, Orakei Marae Committee
and Tainui Awhiro.

The Land Rights Movement of the 1970s had a significant impact upon the
evolution of Maori political activism in the 1980s. In particular, the high
level of political intensity that had characterised the struggle provided
the conditions from which a young, more militant leadership emerged. Most
notably, the Maori land rights movement and the struggle against racism
radicalised a group of Maori women, the core of whom had been involved in
Nga Tamatoa. These women were to form the basis of the Black Women's
Movement.

The land rights movement and the occupation and eviction of members of
Ngati Whatua from Bastion Point, and the arrests at Raglan also prompted
certain activists based primarily in Auckland to adopt a more direct
strategy to undermine racism. This was exemplified in 1979 when He Taua
confronted and assaulted members of an engineering student group who had
traditionally celebrated the University of Auckland's capping week by
making, among other things, obscene imitations of Maori haka.

The Waitangi Action Committee, Maori People's Liberation Movement of
Aotearoa and Black Women were at the forefront of Maori political activism
in the early 1980s. These groups were primarily based in Auckland and
possessed a considerable overlap in membership (Walker, 1984). From 1979
WAC continued the earlier focus of Nga Tamatoa with annual protests at the
Waitangi Day celebrations, arguing that ratification of the Treaty of
Waitangi was a futile objective because the cost of reparations would
effectively bankrupt the state. WAC called for a boycott of the Waitangi
Day celebrations with the objective of escalating opposition to the
celebrations until they were stopped. At this time Maori activists
proclaimed the treaty as a 'fraud' and denounced it as the: ' cheaty of
Waitangi'. WAC used marches to spread their message to various marae on
route to Waitangi and were most successful in bringing together the
Kingitanga and the Kotahitanga movements for the purpose of a hikoi, a
peaceful walk to Waitangi in February 1984.

Maori Sovereignty Flags Over WaitangiInitially activists in groups like WAC
acted in liaison with certain Pakeha anti-racist groups. However, following
the rifts between the anti-racist movement and some Maori groups during the
anti-Springbok Tour protests of 1981 the association between Maori and
Pakeha activists weakened. There was a widespread perception amongst Maori
that too many Pakeha ignored the connection between apartheid in South
Africa and colonialism and racism in Aotearoa (see Awatere, 1981). Groups
like People Oppossed to Waitangi (POW), were widely seen as a way of
accommodating Pakeha support for Maori protest so that Maori could maintain
autonomy in the movement (Jesson, 1983).

(iv) The New Right and Cultural Nationalism from 1984

The prolonged economic crisis in New Zealand throughout the 1970s and 1980s
was brought on by the inherent tendency in capitalist systems for the
general rate of profit to fall which inhibits investment and undermines
capital accumulation (see Roper, 1993: 11-21; Shaikh, 1989; 1991: 185-186).
For the state, capitalism's chronic tendency to produce crises reverberates
to produce a legitimation crises for the whole system. Thus governments
from the 1970s have had to respond to a dual crisis of political
legitimation and economic management, the product of steadily worsening
conditions of economic decline and fiscal instability coupled with a growth
in unemployment, the politicisation of ethnic and gender inequalities, and
other signs of social unrest. In particular, the political turbulence
created by the events of the early 1980s encouraged the widespread
perception that New Zealand was at the turning point in regard to
harmonious race relations. The sense of urgency and concern about the state
of New Zealand society manifested itself in the official report Race
Against Time from the Race Relations Office. It was widely perceived that
New Zealand was tinkering on the edge of a prolonged and irredeemable
racial conflict (Race Relations Concilliator, 1982).

The upsurge in Maori protest and discontent forced governments to respond
to the evidence which showed overwhelmingly that the majority of Maori
occupied a peripheral place in New Zealand society. Numerous studies
confirmed that Maori experienced disproportionately: poor educational
outcomes; high levels of unemployment; low income levels; ill-health and
hence lower life expectancy; higher rates of imprisonment; low rates of
home ownership; and high rates of state dependency.

While those Maori activists involved in movements such as MOOHR, Te Hokioi,
the Polynesian Panthers and land rights at least attempted to find
strategies which could successfully challenge the system which produced
such dramatic inequalities, others ended up pursuing struggles which
represented little or no threat at all to the state. This helped to obscure
the fact that capitalism's tendency towards economic and social crisis was
a result of its internal contradictions.

Initially the politics of Maori cultural nationalism found expression in
the struggle to win Maori studies and language programmes in the education
system. However, the movement ended up far from these traditions and
aspirations. The emphasis on the rediscovery of the role of Maori in
history, not just as victims but as fighters was something to be welcomed.
However, for large parts of the movement the emphasis on the rediscovery of
culture came to be the objective of the movement itself and a substitute
for practical struggle. For the most part, cultural nationalism placed
little or no importance on building a political movement, or on strategies
for far reaching social change.

Particularly in intellectual circles, Maori cultural nationalism became
less a critique of right wing racist politics than an attack on left social
movements. This was best encapsulated in Donna Awatere's polemic, Maori
Sovereignty which was explicitly directed at Pakeha feminists, trade
unionists, socialists, and the Pakeha anti-racist movement. Awatere was to
argue that Pakeha activists were committed to a status quo characterised by
white supremacy and Maori subordination. In spite of the alleged
differences between white women and white men, homosexual and heterosexual,
the working class and the capitalist class, Awatere was to argue all
cleavages occurred within a common cultural framework. All whites shared
the benefits of the alienation of Maori land and culture and the imposition
of European cultural values (Awatere, 1984).

Pakeha society was said to reflect inherent characteristics: it was
competitive, exploitative, valued material success and it eroded or
dominated traditional or radically egalitarian Maori values. Maori
possessed an inherent integrity that had been progressively eroded since
contact. However this status could be redeemed by the immersion in Maori
identity or 'Maoritanga.' Because the inherent traits of Pakeha were the
basic causes of an oppressive and unequal society, the virtues of Maori
were critical for their resolution (see Greenland, 1984: 89).

This became an extremely persuasive ideology throughout the 1980s but
rather than channelling Maori into greater political involvement the
introverted emphasis on Maori consciousness alone tended to lead Maori away
from political activism. This was because the implication was that 'Maori
culture' and identity by itself would automatically bring about political
and economic freedom. With its emphasis on lifestyle changes, cultural
rediscovery represented almost no threat at all to the state which easily
accommodated the rhetoric of cultural nationalism into the language of
state policy-making during the 1980s. In this way, it could accommodate the
idea that the low level of participation and achievement of Maori in
education and employment structures of New Zealand society was the result
of social alienation caused by the loss of cultural identity. Such an
explanation for Maori disadvantage did not represent a threat to the
underlying social relations of capitalist society.

Following its election in July 1984, the fourth Labour Government attempted
to appease the rising tide of Maori protest by enhancing the status of
Maori culture, attracting the commitment of Maori to state institutions and
satisfying Maori demands for self-determination in their own affairs.
Labour did this in two major ways: firstly it extended the jurisdiction of
the Waitangi Tribunal giving it the power to examine Maori grievances
retrospective to 1840. Secondly, the official policy of 'bi-culturalism'
adopted by the fourth Labour Government after 1984 involved the
incorporation of Maori personnel, Maori models of organisation and Maori
social practices and cultural symbolism within the institutions of the
state (see Barber, 1989). The partial adoption of ethnic rhetoric by the
state and the co-optation of elites into state institutions gave the
illusion of a 'partnership' as espoused under the Treaty of Waitangi, while
marginalising the more radical demands (Kelsey, 1993: 234).

Waitangi Tribunal

The Labour Government had assumed that by the introduction of the Treaty of
Waitangi Amendment Act in 1985 the state could somehow take control of the
direction of Treaty issues and shape the nature of Maori demands. From
1985, iwi and hapu diverted time, energy and meagre resources into
researching and presenting claims to the Waitangi Tribunal and in the
judicial system. However, it quickly became apparent that the tribunal was
a body without 'teeth' restricted to making recommendations on particular
claims upon which governments were under no obligation to act.

As Maori demands for political and economic self-determination became more
strident, a contradiction quickly emerged between the economic programme of
market liberalization and the treaty settlement policy (see Kelsey, 1990;
1993). The fourth Labour Government's Maori policy was motivated by an
overriding objective of reducing government expenditure at a time of
economic and fiscal crisis. Labour embarked on an economic restructuring
programme designed to restore levels of profitability in the New Zealand
economy. This was characterised by a monetarist, disinflationary strategy
coupled with a programme of market liberalization, which included the
deregulation of the financial sector; liberalization of foreign trade; the
elimination of so-called 'rigidities' in the labour market; regressive tax
reform; the disassembly of the state sector through privatisation,
commercialisation and corporatisation; and the dismantling of the welfare
state (see Roper, 1991; 1993; Holland and Boston 1990; Boston, 1991).
However, a series of claims before the Waitangi Tribunal became an obstacle
to the sale of many key state owned enterprises, a crucial component in
Labour's restructuring programme. At a time of growing economic and social
dislocation, the political costs for Labour were exacerbated by the
widespread perception that Maori were getting 'special treatment'. Indeed,
the pressures were so great by 1989, that the Labour Government attempted
to play down the significance of its Treaty policy.

Maori Elite

In addition to its Treaty policy, Labour also undertook a process of
co-opting key individuals in the Maori protest movement into a series of
secretive negotiations and consultation. The co-optation of a Maori elite
within the structures of the state forced many Maori leaders to straddle
the uneasy gulf between pushing the Maori struggle forward and maintaining
the existing state of affairs. The prestige and wealth that went with such
privileged positions in the settlement process meant that Maori leaders
became increasingly removed from the concerns and vitality of the flax
roots Maori struggle.

Like the fourth Labour Government, the National Government also set out to
restore levels of profitable investment in the New Zealand economy. The
National Government was concerned that the backlog of treaty claims created
a climate of uncertainty for investors because the ownership of a number of
key resources was in doubt. Treasury officials were concerned about the
fiscal implications of some of the major Treaty claims declaring it an
"unquantifiable fiscal risk" (Southland Times, 1994: 14). National
attempted to end this uncertainty by negotiating a full and final
settlement of all Treaty of Waitangi claims at minimal cost. Like Labour,
the National Government embarked on a series of secret negotiations with a
selected number of corporate warriors and tribal executives which resulted
in a full and final settlement of fishery claims under the Treaty of
Waitangi in the form of the Sealords deal.

The lack of accountability and democracy in such negotiations generated
intense anger and resentment which manifested itself in the bitter internal
divisions that have characterised the recent upsurge in Maori protest over
the signing of the Sealords deal. These divisions were strained further at
the time of the negotiations surrounding the Government's $1 billion Fiscal
Envelope, an attempt to evoke a full and final settlement of all remaining
Treaty of Waitangi claims.

The attempted chain-sawing of the pine tree on One Tree Hill on 28 October
1994, the anniversary of the 1835 Declaration of Independence, the
beheading of the statue of John Ballance at Moutoa Gardens and the
explosion of anger at the 1995 Waitangi celebrations heralded the most
significant upsurge in Maori protest since the 1970s. The occupation of
Wanganui's Moutoa Gardens by Whanganui Maori has been a powerful symbol of
the resurgence in the struggle for mana whenua. The 79-day occupation at
Pakaitore marae had invigorated other struggles around the country, in
particular the occupation by Te Ropu a Te Pohutu of Rotowhio marae at
Whakarewarewa in Rotorua and the occupation of the former Tamaki Girls'
College in Auckland. The upsurge in Maori struggle has also expressed
itself in the occupations of the Takahue school near Kaitaia and of the
court house at Patea. Other struggles include, the Tuhoe embassy in
Taneatua, the occupations of the Taumaranui police station site and Kaitaia
Airport. These occupations have been a long time in the making and reflect
the growing anger, frustration and desperation at the lack of real options
available to Maori for the resolutions of their grievances.

While much of the recent protest has represented a continuation in the
tradition of the land rights movement of the 1970s, some more notable
struggles such as the occupations of Coalcorp land at Huntly by the
Whaawhaakia hapu and of the Waikato University marae by Te Toitutanga and
the other protests in opposition to the $170 million Raupatu settlement
between the Government and the Tainui Trust Board represent a challenge to
the mandate of decision-making bodies within iwi to make such settlement
agreements.

(v) Maori Liberation and the Politics of Identity

While the official policy of bi-culturalism, has resulted in a dramatic
expansion of opportunities for middle class professional Maori, in the
state apparatus, education system, health and the media, the emphasis on
identity alone as the crucial determining factor in Maori oppression has
been an unmitigated disaster for the vast majority of working class Maori
whanau who have borne the brunt of the fourth Labour Government and the
National Government's 'economic restructuring' (Ministry of Maori
Development, 1992).

For the majority of Maori cultural nationalism has failed so dramatically
in this respect because as strategy it has firstly, evaded the significance
of the relative location of the majority of Maori in the working class
within New Zealand's class structure and also the existence of class
differentiation within both Maori and Pakeha populations. Secondly, such an
approach has prevented through its rhetoric and posturing the possibility
of building the strongest movement by combining with other progressive
social movements in order to achieve specific political objectives.
Thirdly, cultural nationalism has in effect provided a way out of engaging
in struggle by encouraging individual lifestyle changes rather than a
strategy for fundamental social change or transformation of society.
Finally, the internal logic of the underlying philosophies of cultural
nationalism have been inherently degenerative, fostering confusion,
demoralisation, and internal fights over authenticity.

Fragmentation

This emphasis on cultural identity as the determining factor in Maori
oppression encouraged the perception that the struggle against Maori
inequality and racism could be reduced to a clash of cultures; a conflict
between 'races.' Indeed, New Zealand history had been characterised by an
irredeemable clash of cultural values. Against the inherent hostility of
Pakeha, Maori sovereignty was the only hope for justice.

One of tendencies of movements which emphasise the identity of their
members as the determining factor in their oppression is to 'personalise'
the conflict for liberation. If you personalise power you tend to
personalise the enemy. Hence the struggle for equality becomes reduced to a
fight against prejudice, the fight against the institutions and practices
against individuals and attitudes not against the system that perpetuates
that oppression. In this way one of the most notable features of Maori
protest from the late 1970s is the increasing personalisation of the Maori
struggle for liberation whereby the object of Maori oppression is Pakeha
and the Pakeha culture. This leaves the struggle against Maori oppression
to be fought out at the level of individual relationships between Maori and
Pakeha while the system in which this relationship occurs remains untouched.

The conclusion that Pakeha are the enemy of Maori is very pessimistic to
say the least. Moreover, since cultural nationalists explain the division
between Maori and Pakeha as biologically rooted, the rupture must be
permanent. From this, it follows that any strategy aimed at the liberation
of Maori necessitates an apocalyptic struggle because the very existence of
Pakeha is the basis of Maori oppression.

Given that identities are blurred, multiple and historically contingent the
idea that the main division in society is between Maori and Pakeha also
risks fragmentation of the movement itself because it inevitably leads to
confusion and fights over authenticity (di Leonardo, 1994: 168). Thus if
the reasoning of identity politics is taken to its logical conclusion then
Pakeha are not the only oppressors: men are oppressors, heterosexuals are
oppressors and so forth. The fragmentation and demoralisation of the
women's liberation movement according to sexuality, class and race
demonstrates this precisely (Smith, 1994: 4-5).

Class Divisions

While it is certainly true that for some left wing groups the belief in the
centrality of working class struggle disguised a fundamental resistance or
in some cases hostility to the struggles of Maori activists, it is also a
notorious fact that Maori movements since the 1980s have tended to fight
for the political changes of greatest benefit to those Maori already middle
class or wealthy. In this regard, cultural nationalism and the politics of
Maori identity have been the perfect social theory for the upwardly mobile
Maori middle class because it presents the interests of Maori in
contemporary capitalist society as essentially unitary. Thus the affluent
right-wing individuals such individuals as Donna Awatere (Maori affairs
spokesperson for the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT)) right
through to the interests of the Maori unemployed, homeless and hungry of
South Auckland's 'ghettoes' can presented as philosophically and culturally
the same. This ignores the critical importance of differential access to
economic and political power within and across Maori society.

Indeed, Maori are all too frequently discussed by cultural nationalists as
if forming one homogeneous entity, its members possessing exactly the same
experiences of oppression, and exactly the same political aspirations.
However, this ignores the fact that there exists a dynamic range of
aspirations and political strategies within so-called 'Maoridom.' Moreover,
these aspirations often conflict with one another and are not divorced from
the influence of the wider social and economic environment.

The emphasis on Maori solidarity conceals the historical reality of social
class stratification within both 'traditional' and contemporary Maori
society. Since the differential incorporation of Maori into the working
class it is imperative that we recognise the fundamental antagonism in
capitalist social relations between capital and labour. It is also
important to recognise the inequalities that exist between men and women.

Cultural nationalist approaches also ignore the fact that Pakeha in
capitalist society are not a homogeneous group that confront Maori in a
unified and hostile manner. The fact is that like Maori, Pakeha, in
capitalist society are also stratified according to class and gender. Thus
references to 'Pakeha society', 'majority culture', and so forth, may be
useful rhetorical devices to focus blame and motivate action but they are
not useful concepts for explaining social reality nor are they useful as
the basis of a strategy for Maori liberation (Loomis, 1990: 4).

The idea that Pakeha are innately materialistic, exploitative and
aggressive is fundamentally problematic. It assumes that the underlying
values and behaviour of Pakeha as exhibited in capitalist society are
primordial and static. This ignores the fact that the construction of
identity at any point in time is socially constructed and historically
contingent. Thus what it means to identify as Maori or Pakeha changes
radically throughout history reflecting the dynamic relationship between
changing material conditions and the way in which those societies are
organised.

Lifestyle Changes

The idea that 'Maori culture' and identity by itself will automatically
bring about political and economic freedom provides a way out of engaging
in struggle. Indeed, what is conspicuously absent in cultural nationalist
accounts is talk of transformation and change. Indeed, such an introverted
focus has tended to encourage strategies based primarily on changes in
individual lifestyle which is detached from any emphasis on collective
Maori struggle to construct and change any aspect of the world we inhabit.
Thus in recent decades there has been the progressive decline of the active
base of the movement, and the rise of strategies based upon 'direct action'
tactics: "...attention grabbing actions carried out by the enlightened few,
the aim being to shock and disturb the ignorant masses" (Smith, 1994: 20).

The emphasis on the rediscovery of traditional culture as the solution to
the basic causes of Maori oppression has involved a celebration of Maori
superior virtue, spirituality and attachment to nature. The frequent
references to the special nature of Maori society and the separate and
enhancing 'world of the Maori' are testament to this. However, it is
important to note that such appeals to a special 'nature' as a guide to
human action provide few secure reference points (Segal, 1987: 7). Indeed,
conceptions of the 'natural' have changed radically throughout human history.

Autonomy in Struggle

The assumption that only those actually experiencing a particular form of
oppression can either define it or fight against it has gained a following
on the left commensurate with the decline of the level of class struggle in
the main advanced capitalist societies from the mid-1970s through the 1980s
(Smith, 1994: 5). For movements organised on the basis of the identity of
their participants, the enemy tends to include "everyone else" perceived as
an amorphous, backward blob which makes up the rest of society (Ibid.) It
is assumed that in some way that society at large benefits from a
particular form of oppression and have an interest in maintaining it. From
this rather pessimistic conclusion it follows that each oppressed group
should have its own distinct and separate movement. Hence, the so called
'new social movements' that have arisen during the 1970s and 1980s tend to
be organised on the basis of 'autonomy' or independence from each other.

While no Maori organisations have been built specifically on the basis of
identity politics many of its key assumptions have gained widespread
acceptance amongst anti-racists both Maori and Pakeha alike. In this
regard, one of the most significant developments in the evolution of Maori
political activism since the early 1980s has been the extent to which Maori
movements have adopted the language of identity politics.

Indeed, one of the central tenets of cultural nationalism has been the idea
that Pakeha have a fundamental interest in maintaining racism in Aotearoa
and that their contribution to the movement for Maori liberation is more
likely to be divisive than constructive. It has followed from this that the
most effective way of fighting racism and discrimination was for Maori to
organise and struggle separately. This emphasis on autonomy in struggle has
resulted theoretically at least, in the exclusion of Pakeha, whatever their
social class and gender, from playing a key role in fighting for Maori
liberation. However, this stance is fundamentally problematic in two major
respects: firstly, because there is no necessary or immediate unity between
oppressed groups in Aotearoa, most lack the required resources to fight
back when they are isolated from each other. Unfortunately, the perception
that the struggle for tino rangatiratanga is primarily a Maori versus
Pakeha struggle forces Maori to struggle against the entire Pakeha
population. In essence this isolates the Maori struggle forcing it to rely
entirely on its own resources. Given the fact that these resources are
meagre, the struggle is very unequal to say the least. Secondly, movements
consisting of Maori alone have no real social power to fundamentally
transform their oppression. Historical evidence shows that political
movements based solely on the 'identity 'of the participant tend to lurch
from left to right of the political spectrum precisely because they have no
real means to achieve their political aims.

It is also important to remember that it is not necessarily true that
autonomous movements in and of themselves raise the issues and struggles of
the oppressed because even these movements are not autonomous of the
underlying social structures, political forces and ideologies of capitalist
society. There is therefore, no guarantee that self-organisation of the
oppressed will produce the best political strategies for liberation. All
too often, for example, the interests of middle class elements have become
dominant within these so called 'autonomous' movements, as the history of
the women's movement and Black nationalism have clearly shown (see Shawki
1990: 92-99; Segal, 1987).

Conclusion

It is only through a critical assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and
effectiveness of the various strategies for Maori liberation, and the
groups that wage them, that we can hope to build the strongest possible
movement. One of the most significant developments in the evolution of
Maori political activism since the late 1960s has been the increasing use
of culture and identity as a strategy for dealing with Maori disadvantage
and perceived powerlessness. This has been the dominant ideology in the
Maori nationalist movement since the early 1980s. However, cultural
nationalism is not a primordial phenomenon that constitutes the only
authentic strategy for dealing with Maori disadvantage. Rather Maori
cultural nationalism is a relatively recent phase in Maori political
development, which has, as this paper shows, embraced a considerable
variety of political strategies, campaigns and participants.

The recent upsurge in Maori political activism following the Sealords deal
and the fiscal envelope proposal has exposed the failure of cultural
nationalist strategies to provide a real solution to Treaty of Waitangi
grievances and Maori disadvantage in wider society. Indeed, while the
cultural nationalist emphasis on the rediscovery of Maori identity was
something to be welcomed, the rediscovery of culture as an end in itself
and a substitute for far reaching social change has been a disaster.

Cultural nationalist strategies have done nothing to change the material
reality for the vast majority of Maori. Thus, while a few corporate
warriors, tribal executives, and middle class Maori professionals have
benefited form the narrow pro-business agenda of the New Right, the
Employment Contracts Act, the benefit cuts, user-pays education and health
have all impacted most severely on working class Maori whanau. By failing
to challenge the underlying power structures in Aotearoa, cultural
nationalism cannot provide a solution to the problems that face most Maori.

While culture and identity remain absolutely essential to Maori social
well-being, it does not automatically follow that cultural identity alone
should provide the organisational basis for the fight against racism and
Maori disadvantage. Because identities are blurred and multiple, any fight
against Maori oppression must be based upon building the strongest possible
liberation movement by uniting different oppressed groups into a common
struggle. This is essential because true liberation for Maori will not
occur without a fundamental transformation of capitalist society and the
creation of a classless society in which there is real women's liberation,
gay and lesbian liberation, and freedom from racism. It is not necessary to
actually experience a particular form of oppression in order to fight
against it, any more than it is necessary to be destitute in order to fight
poverty (Smith 1994: 4). All those struggling for a better society can
learn to recognise and identify with those facing particular oppressions
and can be enlisted as common allies in the struggle.