International Socialists

By Sam Campbell

The past 48 years have represented a great continuity for the people of Syria, or in the words of historian Fawwaz Trabousli, “one single era characterized by repression, military dictatorship and one-party rule.” Syria exists as a police state where on every street corner and every restaurant people live with the knowledge that they may be being observed by secret police or the vast army of informants that have come to typify the Ba’th regime. 2011 represents a challenge to this continuity, but unlike in Egypt, Libya or Tunisia this revolution is held back by divisions and a vivid history of repression.

The last great uprising, led by the Muslim brotherhood, took place in 1982 culminating in the siege of the city of Hama. At the head of this siege was President Hafiz al-Assad’s brother Rifaat and his elite, pink uniformed ‘Defence Companies’. In three weeks the Syrian government slaughtered 10-40,000 people (in a city of 250,000). This is the history that Syrian’s are overcoming ever day in their revolution. Rifaat now lives in London’s wealthy Mayfair district, with his son now appearing on the likes of the BBC to represent his father’s democratic credentials.

The current president of Syria is Bashar al-Assad, succeeding his father, Hafiz, after his death in 2000. Hafiz’ rule had begun in 1970 in an internal Ba’th party coup, known as the Corrective Revolution. Hafiz, the first of his poor Alawite peasant family to graduate from high school, had been an air force officer from the north-western province of Latakia. The Alawi, who in Syria had long been a marginalized peasant population, are a small Islamic sect, generally considered a branch of Shi’a Islam. When Hafiz and his cohorts took power they were seen to some extent as representatives of not only the Alawi, but other sectors of Syria’s rural poor. However, lacking a popular base the young officers sort the support of Muslim Brotherhood chief Issam al-Attar. Attar gave this support in exchange for policies to benefit the brotherhoods leading stratum among the Damascene merchant class. By 1975 this alliance had begun to fall apart as a new layer of young Islamists in the brotherhood railed against massive inflation, rising housing prices and tensions between the Ba’th party and Palestinian radicals. This new layer of Islamists was comprised of the children of the petty bourgeoisie. They were students, teachers and professionals and typified the social base that was to spearhead the re-emergence of Islamism throughout the region.

The current uprising is very much a rural movement by those who have economically suffered the worst under the neo-liberal cronyism of Bashar al-Assad. Under his rule productive industries that once employed large numbers of youth have been dismantled, while the economy has been transformed into a rentier economy controlled by those linked to the regime. This is epitomized in the billionaire relatives of Bashar, such as Rami Makhluf (whose corruption has become a target for the revolution) and Mohamed Hamsho (who ran for a ‘workers’ seat in the last election). This is at the same time that Syria’s youth, comprising over a quarter of the population, struggle with massive unemployment rates. While Syria’s unemployment rate is on par with other countries in the region (at about 25%), the country is distinguished by youth unemployment rates that are six times higher than among older Syrian adults. Such turbulent economic and political unrest has, however, been met with scepticism as to whether what happened in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia can be repeated in Syria. The difficulty is that the revolution has yet to spread to the economic and political hubs of the country: Aleppo and Damascus. One of the main reasons for this is the share scale of the regimes presence in these cities, which has stymied people’s willingness to take to the streets. But behind this are other factors, such as the fact that the rural population has suffered worse economically than their urban counterparts. In the cities the business elites are yet to see the need to jump ship, while the religious establishment has to some extent been embraced by the regime. The neo-liberal embezzlement of Syria’s elite has trickled down to certain layers of the urban middle class, leading to passivity. In Aleppo, the large Christian minority remains supportive of the regime, for as like most other minorities in the country the current Alawite regime represents a buttress against Sunni domination of the country (Sunni represent about 74% of the population, Alawi and other non-Sunni 13%, Christians 10%, and Druze 3%).

The importance of the city is its working class. While often relegated in importance behind twitter and Facebook in coverage of the Arab revolutions, it is the entrance of the organised working class that was pivotal in the most successful revolutions (i.e. Egypt and Tunisia). In Syria the working class has long been led by corrupt unions that have strongly supported the regime. Independent unions do not exist, the Communist parties have long been repressed and discredited through their involvement with the regime and the Arab left’s long history of allying with dictatorships has distorted the ideas of socialism and democracy. Until the working class in Aleppo and Damascus come onto the streets the revolution will persist in its current scale, with the army moving back and forward putting down isolated revolts. However, if the revolts in the hinterland of these cities spreads into the poor working class areas the isolated hubs of revolt may just turn into a national revolution.

Outside Damascus foreign powers wait to see what will unfold in this pivotal Middle Eastern state. Within the local configuration of power Syria represents the lynch pin between Iran and its Palestinian and Lebanese allies. For Saudi Arabia, Assad’s demise would provide an opportunity to break Iran’s regional influence. The rise of a democratic Syria could also rekindle the countries historic political ties with Egypt. Another factor is Turkey, which apart from being the most outspoken opponent of Syria’s current repression is seeking greater influence in the region, particularly with Egypt and the Palestinians. At the heart of all of this lies Israel and by extension the United States, who both remain unsure about what they really want in Syria. While Syria has long been in conflict with Israel, it has long walked a cautious line between antagonism and compromise, long holding out the prospect that a peace treaty could be made in exchange for the Golan Heights and greater international recognition. For many in Washington and Tel Aviv (as well as in London, Paris and Rome) the current Syrian regime is a source of aggravation, but it also provides a continuity that may be lost in any coming revolution.